The Naga truce is nothing but loose!

HAD the depth, range and nature of the Nagaland ceasefire between the Centre and the NSCN(Isak-Muivah) that came into force on 1 August 1997 been defined clearly enough, perhaps there would have been no reason for either side to complain, as happens occasionally. The ground rules prohibit cadres from roaming in uniform and collecting “taxes” and they are required to remain confined to their designated camps — which rules have never been strictly observed. Worse, over the period both sides have traded charges of violating the truce.
The ceasefire is confined to Nagaland but the NSCN(IM) leadership has often asserted that the Centre agreed “in principle” to include some areas in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur. When, in June 2001, the Centre extended the ceasefire to Manipur’s hill districts the state went up in flames, with the outbreak of violence claiming 13 lives and the destruction of property worth lakhs of rupees.
A few days after the commencement of the ceasefire in August 1997, when NSCN(IM) chairman Isak Swu claimed the Centre had accepted the Naga demand for an extension of the ceasefire, it triggered a wave of protests in Manipur and, for the first time, drove a wedge between Nagas and Meiteis.
The truce is under stress once more. As this is written, rebel cadres and the Assam Rifles are facing off in Manipur’s Ukhrul district from where NSCN(IM) general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah comes. According to reports, the Assam Rifles surrounded a camp run by NSCN(IM) cadres at Shiroy village where, they were reminded, that they were violating the truce and, therefore, asked to surrender their weapons. But with the standoff continuing, the Union home ministry asked both sides to vacate the village and set a 72-hour deadline, which expired on 26 January.
The Assam Rifles claimed that on the NSCN(IM)’s request it agreed to provide safe passage for the cadres “as a one time measure” if they moved out with their weapons. A NSCN(IM) spokesman later said that “they are prepared to abide by the home ministry directive but unless the government of India gives us a designated camp in place of Shiroy, where do we go? We will remain at the Shiroy camp”.
Yet another statement from Hebron, the NSCN(IM) designated camp near Dimapur in Nagaland, said that “after (a) minute discussion, taking due consideration of the prevailing deteriorating situation, and in contemplation of (the) impending danger ahead, (we) vow to resist all forms of antagonism with renewed enthusiasm to guard the sacred cause of the Naga nation”.
Here the pertinent question is: why has the NSCN(IM) suddenly thought it prudent to set up a designated camp in Manipur which does not come under the ceasefire purview? One is given to understand this sort of arrangement is made only after a ceasefire is signed, as many of the smaller outfits have done. If the Centre allows NSCN(IM) cadres to run the Shiroy camp, this will amount to the admission that the ceasefire is also applicable to Manipur. And what is the guarantee that the cadres will not set up such camps in all the hill districts which, they claim, belong to them?
The Shiroy incident is not an isolated case. In 2002, some NSCN (IM) armed and uniformed cadres travelled the Pallel-Moreh Road (National Highway 39) in Manipur and, when challenged by personnel manning a checkpost, they allegedly fired on them and in the exchange 11 cadres were killed. The NSCN(IM) described this as “cold blooded", but the Manipur administration stood its ground that the security personnel retaliated only when fired upon.
The Centre must take a stand and ensure there is no repeat of what happened at Shiroy. Whoever violated the truce must be dealt with firmly. The Army and the Assam Rifles are discharging their duties — in checking the growth of such clandestine camps. And if such were not their responsibility, what purpose would it serve to deploy so many men in government uniform?

SNS